The normative role of logic for reasoning
Article in THEORIA : an International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science (September 2023)
Revisiting Searle on Deriving "Ought" from "Is"
Overview of attention for book
Table of Contents
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Altmetric BadgeBook Overview
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Altmetric BadgeChapter 1 How to Derive “Ought” from “Is” Revisited
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Altmetric BadgeChapter 2 An Interview with John R. Searle
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Altmetric BadgeChapter 3 Is and Ought: Where Does the Problem Lie?
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Altmetric BadgeChapter 4 Searlean “Is” and “Ought” Revisited
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Altmetric BadgeChapter 5 Some Remarks on Searle’s View on the Logic of Practical Reasoning
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Altmetric BadgeChapter 6 On the Regulative Functions of Constitutive Rules
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Altmetric BadgeChapter 7 Existence as a Source of Normativity: An Alternative to Searle’s View
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Altmetric BadgeChapter 8 How to Derive Is from Ought
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Altmetric BadgeChapter 9 Searle vs. Conte on Constitutive Rules
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Altmetric BadgeChapter 10 “Ought” Is Spoken in Many Ways
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Altmetric BadgeChapter 11 Constitutive Rules, Criteria of Validity, and Law
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Altmetric BadgeChapter 12 Can Constitutive Rules Bridge the Gap Between Is- and Ought-Statements?
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Altmetric BadgeChapter 13 Searle and Conte on Deriving Ought from Is
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Altmetric BadgeChapter 14 Why Moral Norms Cannot Be Reduced to Facts: On a Trilemma in Derivations of Moral “Ought” from “Is”
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Altmetric BadgeChapter 15 On Searle’s Derivation and Its Relation to Constitutive Rules: A Social Scientist’s Perspective
Attention for Chapter 15:
On Searle’s Derivation and Its Relation to Constitutive Rules: A Social Scientist’s Perspective
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Citations
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