Revisiting Searle on Deriving "Ought" from "Is"

Chapter 1 How to Derive “Ought” from “Is” Revisited

Chapter 3 Is and Ought: Where Does the Problem Lie?

Chapter 4 Searlean “Is” and “Ought” Revisited

Chapter 5 Some Remarks on Searle’s View on the Logic of Practical Reasoning

Chapter 6 On the Regulative Functions of Constitutive Rules

Chapter 7 Existence as a Source of Normativity: An Alternative to Searle’s View

Chapter 8 How to Derive Is from Ought

Chapter 9 Searle vs. Conte on Constitutive Rules

Chapter 10 “Ought” Is Spoken in Many Ways

Chapter 11 Constitutive Rules, Criteria of Validity, and Law

Chapter 12 Can Constitutive Rules Bridge the Gap Between Is- and Ought-Statements?

Chapter 13 Searle and Conte on Deriving Ought from Is

Chapter 14 Why Moral Norms Cannot Be Reduced to Facts: On a Trilemma in Derivations of Moral “Ought” from “Is”

Chapter 15 On Searle’s Derivation and Its Relation to Constitutive Rules: A Social Scientist’s Perspective