Revisiting Searle on Deriving "Ought" from "Is"

Chapter 1 How to Derive “Ought” from “Is” Revisited

Chapter 2 An Interview with John R. Searle

Chapter 3 Is and Ought: Where Does the Problem Lie?

Chapter 4 Searlean “Is” and “Ought” Revisited

Chapter 5 Some Remarks on Searle’s View on the Logic of Practical Reasoning

Chapter 6 On the Regulative Functions of Constitutive Rules

Chapter 7 Existence as a Source of Normativity: An Alternative to Searle’s View

Chapter 8 How to Derive Is from Ought

Chapter 9 Searle vs. Conte on Constitutive Rules

Chapter 11 Constitutive Rules, Criteria of Validity, and Law

Chapter 12 Can Constitutive Rules Bridge the Gap Between Is- and Ought-Statements?

Chapter 13 Searle and Conte on Deriving Ought from Is

Chapter 14 Why Moral Norms Cannot Be Reduced to Facts: On a Trilemma in Derivations of Moral “Ought” from “Is”

Chapter 15 On Searle’s Derivation and Its Relation to Constitutive Rules: A Social Scientist’s Perspective