Chapter 1 Veto Player Theory and Policy Change: An Introduction

Chapter 2 Empirical Applications of Veto Player Analysis and Institutional Effectiveness

Chapter 3 The Veto Player Approach in Macro-Comparative Politics: Concepts and Measurement

Chapter 4 Measuring Policy Positions of Veto Players in Parliamentary Democracies

Chapter 5 Mutual Veto? How Coalitions Work

Chapter 6 Veto Players, Agenda Control and Cabinet Stability in 17 European Parliaments, 1945–1999

Chapter 7 The Sources of Bipartisan Politics in Parliamentary Democracies

Chapter 8 Why Don’t Veto Players Use Their Power?

Chapter 9 Testing the Law-Making Theories in a Parliamentary Democracy: A Roll Call Analysis of the Italian Chamber of Deputies (1988–2008)

Chapter 11 Strategic Voting in a Bicameral Setting

Chapter 12 Game Theoretic Models and the Empirical Analysis of EU Policy Making: Strategic Interaction, Collective Decisions, and Statistical Inference

Chapter 13 Veto Players, Reform Processes and Policy Change: Concluding Remarks