Chapter 1 Introduction

Chapter 2 Randomized Judicial Review

Chapter 3 On the Difficulty to Ground the Authority of Constitutional Courts: Can Strong Judicial Review Be Morally Justified?

Chapter 4 Reason Without Vote: The Representative and Majoritarian Function of Constitutional Courts

Chapter 5 Decoupling Judicial Review from Judicial Supremacy

Chapter 6 Scope and Limits of Dialogic Constitutionalism

Chapter 7 A Defence of a Broader Sense of Constitutional Dialogues Based on Jeremy Waldron’s Criticism on Judicial Review

Chapter 8 New Institutional Mechanisms for Making Constitutional Law

Chapter 9 Democratic Constitutional Change: Assessing Institutional Possibilities

Chapter 10 The Unconstitutionality of Constitutional Amendments in Colombia: The Tension Between Majoritarian Democracy and Constitutional Democracy

Chapter 12 Judicial Reference to Community Values – A Pointer Towards Constitutional Juries?

Chapter 13 Common Law Constitutionalism and the Written Constitution

Chapter 14 On How Law Is Not Like Chess – Dworkin and the Theory of Conceptual Types