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Game Equilibrium Models IV

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Cover of 'Game Equilibrium Models IV'

Table of Contents

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    Book Overview
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    Chapter 1 Introduction to the Series “Game Equilibrium Models”
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    Chapter 2 Introduction to Volume IV: “Social and Political Interaction”
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    Chapter 3 Majority Voting in the Condorcet Paradox as a Problem of Equilibrium Selection
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    Chapter 4 Does Concession Always Prevent Pressure?
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    Chapter 5 The Distribution of Foreign Language Skills as a Game Equilibrium
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    Chapter 6 Resisting the Draft a Perfect Equilibrium Approach
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    Chapter 7 Altruism in Social Dilemmas — Failure to Catch It in a Parameter
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    Chapter 8 The Strategy of Challenges: Two Beheading Games in Mediaeval Literature
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    Chapter 9 Balance of Power in a Parlor Game
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    Chapter 10 Modelling Alliance Formation: A Noncooperative Approach
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    Chapter 11 The (Stability of the) Western Defense Alliance
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    Chapter 12 Implications of the Defense Efficiency Hypothesis for the Choice of Military Force Structures. Part I: Games with and without Complete Information about the Antagonist’s Intentions
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    Chapter 13 Implications of the Defense Efficiency Hypothesis for the Choice of Military Force Structures. Part II: A Sequential Game Including the Possibility of Restructuring Forces
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    Chapter 14 Inspector Leadership with Incomplete Information
Attention for Chapter 12: Implications of the Defense Efficiency Hypothesis for the Choice of Military Force Structures. Part I: Games with and without Complete Information about the Antagonist’s Intentions
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Chapter title
Implications of the Defense Efficiency Hypothesis for the Choice of Military Force Structures. Part I: Games with and without Complete Information about the Antagonist’s Intentions
Chapter number 12
Book title
Game Equilibrium Models IV
Published by
Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, January 1991
DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-07369-8_12
Book ISBNs
978-3-64-208111-8, 978-3-66-207369-8
Authors

Rudolf Avenhaus, Werner Güth, Reiner K. Huber

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