Chapter 1 Approaches to the Bargaining Problem before and after the Theory of Games: A Critical Discussion of Zeuthen’s, Hicks’, and Nash’s Theories

Chapter 2 On the Rationality Postulates Underlying the Theory of Cooperative Games

Chapter 3 A Simplified Bargaining Model for the n -Person Cooperative Game

Chapter 4 Games with Randomly Disturbed Payoffs: A New Rationale for Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium Points

Chapter 5 Oddness of the Number of Equilibrium Points: A New Proof

Chapter 6 Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model

Chapter 7 Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players

Chapter 8 Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players

Chapter 9 Uses of Bayesian Probability Models in Game Theory

Chapter 10 An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition

Chapter 12 Rule Utilitarianism, Rights, Obligations and the Theory of Rational Behavior